Electromagnetic resilience of critical national infrastructure
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摘要: 随着国家关键基础设施建设规模和信息化水平的提升，其在高空电磁脉冲、有意电磁干扰和地磁暴等强电磁环境下的电磁安全逐渐受到了国内外的关注。强电磁环境属于小概率、高风险事件，其影响机理和评估方法与雷电、系统内过电压等常规电磁事件有较大不同，采用期望风险指标的常规可靠性分析方法难以有效评估管理强电磁环境相关风险。从电磁恢复力视角出发，提出了关键基础设施电磁安全的三棱锥模型，并重点以电网为例，探讨关键基础设施电磁恢复力的内涵和外延，并对开展电磁恢复力研究提出建议。Abstract: With the increase in the system scale and informatization level of the critical national infrastructures, the electromagnetic security in extreme electromagnetic environments such as the high-altitude electromagnetic pulse, the intentional electromagnetic interference and the geomagnetic storm has attracted more attention. Unlike conventional electromagnetic events such as the lightning and the overvoltage in power systems, extreme electromagnetic environments are small-probability but high-risk events whose impact mechanisms and evaluation methods are quite different. And the conventional reliability analysis, which adopts the expected value indexes, is difficult to effectively evaluate and manage the risks related to extreme electromagnetic environments. In this context, this paper presents a triangular pyramid model for the study of electromagnetic security of critical infrastructures. Then taking the power grid as an example, it discusses the implication and significance of electromagnetic resilience to critical infrastructures, and finally makes a proposal for the future study of electromagnetic resilience.
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图 2 电磁环境对设备级影响的相关概念
Figure 2. Concepts related to the impact of the electromagnetic environment on the equipment
图 3 电磁事件作用下系统响应类型
Figure 3. Types of system response under electromagnetic disturbance
图 4 关键基础设施电磁安全三棱锥模型
Figure 4. Triangular pyramid model for the electromagnetic security of critical infrastructures
图 5 基础设施电磁安全建设的三个维度
Figure 5. Three dimensions of infrastructure electromagnetic security construction
表 1 典型强电磁环境的特性对比
Table 1. Comparison of characteristics of typical extreme electromagnetic environment
EM threat main frequency range amplitude main vulnerable equipment in power grids and its effect phenomena radius of influence HEMP 0.1~100 MHz(E1)
100 kHz below(E2)
0.1 mHz ~1 Hz(E3)50 kV/m(E1)
10~100 V/m(E2)
30~85 V/km(E3)disturbance or damage to the generator control system, insulation problems at the winding ends of transformers & reactors, DC biasing of high voltage transformers, fault of SCADA system in power grid, incorrect operation of relay protection, flashover of distribution insulators and failure of distribution transformers, etc. hundreds of kilometers~ thousands of kilometers IEMI 300MHz~tens of GHz dozens of kV/m~ hundreds of kV/m failure of secondary equipment such as power grid SCADA and relay protection system several meters~ tens of kilometers GMD 0.1 mHz~0.1 Hz 1~10 V/km DC biasing of high voltage transformers hundreds of kilometers~ thousands of kilometers 
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